The diplomatic relationship between Italy and Spain, long underpinned by shared geography and economic interests, has recently soured over a deepening dispute concerning migration. What began with Italy’s reintroduction of border controls on travelers from Spain, following a significant influx of migrants into the Spanish enclave of Ceuta, has quickly escalated into a tit-for-tat exchange, with Spain reciprocating by imposing its own checks on Italian arrivals. This escalating friction exposes a notable political divergence between two nations that, on paper, should be natural allies.
Just four years ago, in 2020, Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez highlighted the potential for cooperation between the two countries, remarking, “It shouldn’t be possible for two natural allies and friends like Spain and Italy not to take full advantage of their joint potential.” Indeed, the structural forces drawing Rome and Madrid together are substantial. Both are crucial Mediterranean frontline states for migration from North Africa, sharing significant economic and political stakes in the southern neighborhood. This shared perspective has historically led them to advocate for a more prominent role for the Mediterranean within EU policy, a stance reflected in the EU’s 2025 Pact for the Mediterranean, which prioritizes stability, economic development, security, and migration management in the region. Their alignment extends to budgetary matters as well; both countries have consistently pushed for an expansive EU budget, advocating for substantial regional funding and agricultural subsidies. As the primary beneficiaries of the NextGenerationEU post-pandemic stimulus fund, they also concur on a gradual repayment schedule and the expansion of joint borrowing mechanisms for future investments.
Despite these areas of ongoing partnership, migration has emerged as a stark dividing line. Claudio Francavilla, an associate director at Human Rights Watch, observed that “Ceuta’s fabricated crisis exposed once again how Europe’s migration obsession is one of its strongest vulnerabilities: its neighbors can exploit it for political pressure, its far right for political gains.” He lamented that “Orderly, safe, rights-respecting migration policies remain a mirage, as do European unity and solidarity on the matter.” Paradoxically, both Rome and Madrid agree that Mediterranean migration is a challenge too large for frontline countries to tackle alone, necessitating a common EU framework. However, their approaches, shaped by significant political differences, diverge sharply.
Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s right-wing government has centered its migration strategy on deterrence, returns, external partnerships, and stricter controls. Rome has actively promoted its model of return hubs in third countries, exemplified by its trial in Albania, seeking to implement this approach at the EU level through controversial new migration legislation. In contrast, Pedro Sánchez’s center-left government has adopted a more varied strategy, combining cooperation with nations like Morocco with initiatives for legal migration and the regularization of undocumented migrants already within Spain. This approach faced criticism from other EU countries and right-wing elements across Europe after the Ceuta crisis, where tens of thousands entered the Spanish enclave from Morocco, and Madrid’s regularization policy was decried as a “pull factor.” Sánchez, alongside French President Emmanuel Macron, has been critical of return hubs, viewing them as inefficient and detrimental to Europe’s international reputation.
This dispute highlights a broader shift in European politics. Migration policy, once primarily a confrontation between frontline states and the rest of the EU, now sees divisions emerging among the frontline countries themselves. The two nations that have consistently called for burden-sharing on migration within Europe are now at odds over the practical implications of such sharing, their positions hardened by domestic political pressures. The political chasm between Rome and Madrid is significant: Sánchez leads one of Europe’s few remaining center-left governments, while Meloni heads a far-right coalition.
The current diplomatic crisis unfolds as both countries prepare for elections next year. In Spain, national polling places the center-right opposition Partido Popular ahead, with the hard-right Vox solidifying its position as the third-largest political force. The Ceuta crisis has provided Sánchez’s opponents with ammunition to portray his migration policy as overly lenient, while his government endeavors to demonstrate its capacity for managing external borders without adopting the harder-right European model. In Italy, Meloni remains a dominant figure on the right, but her government faces competition from even further right. MEP Roberto Vannacci, who recently left Matteo Salvini’s League, has launched his own political movement, National Future. With Italy reforming its electoral law, Vannacci poses a threat, potentially eroding support for the right-wing coalition and leading to a hung parliament. MEP Sandro Gozi, from France, suggested that Meloni’s decision to reintroduce border controls with Spain was driven more by polls favoring Vannacci in Rome than by the realities in Ceuta. Since taking office in 2022, Meloni has moderated some positions to reassure international investors and partners, but Vannacci’s challenge on migration is reshaping that calculation. Across Italy, Spain, and beyond, migration remains a deeply divisive issue, and when these differences align with domestic electoral incentives, even countries with strong strategic commonalities can find themselves at odds.
